




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
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SUSPENSE: <u>29 Mar 89</u> Date			
REMARKS: STAT			



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-



27 MAR 1989

U-33,037/DC-3

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

STAT

SUBJECT: Proposal to Improve the DCI's Process for Requirements, Priorities, and Evaluation

Reference: a. D/ICS Memo NFIC 2.1/47, 20 Mar 89.

b. DIA Memo U-30,005/DC-3, 19 Jan 89.


1. As stated in reference b., the value added of a complete overhaul of the system has not been demonstrated. Therefore, the most viable course of action in seeking to improve the DCI's top level requirements and evaluation process is to create, for now, only a draft of the DCI overview document or bibliography as it is now referred to. The accuracy and utility of this document could then be fully assessed by policymakers and NFIC principals before implementation of any other proposed changes to the current way of doing business.

2. Further changes to the process should be considered only if the value added can be clearly demonstrated. The proposal to integrate into one document information contained in the NITs, FIRCAP and COFIR is acceptable provided that the new document ensures that the substantive content, connectivity and purpose of existing documentation is maintained. In addition it must also establish traceability to U.S. policy.

3. Concur that more attention should be given to cross program evaluations and identification of intelligence gaps. DoD elements must be full participants in the review process to ensure that all valid military requirements are addressed.

4. It is acknowledged that Executive Order 12333 gives the DCI authority to levy analytical tasks on departmental intelligence production organizations in consultation with those organizations. However, believe that the NIC process has proven to be a satisfactory means of meeting the needs of national-level consumers via the estimates program. Because of this it is recommended that the IPC be maintained as an advisory entity, charged with identifying unwarranted duplication of effort or production gaps and bringing it to the attention of the DCI and the producer agencies for resolution as appropriate.

5. In summary, let's limit this proposal to improve the top level requirements process to producing a draft DCI overview document (or bibliography) before implementing the other recommendations contained in reference a. This is a coordinated DIA and U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy response.



HARRY E. SOYTER
Lieutenant General, USA
Director



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-1001



DAMI-FII

28 March 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

SUBJECT: Army Staff's Response to the Proposal to Improve the
DCI's Process for Requirements, Priorities, and
Evaluation.

1. The Army Staff will need more time to adequately consider the impact of this proposal on its present intelligence activities and on relationships between Army intelligence producers and their customers. In general terms the ODCSINT supports the position of the Defense Intelligence Agency on this proposal as articulated in the DIA memorandum, Subject: Proposal to Improve the DCI's Process for Requirements, Priorities, and Evaluation dated 27 March 1989.

2. After a very quick review by my staff, there are concerns as to what kind of a problem there is to correct. Policy makers have not called for a reform of intelligence production. A 1988 Intelligence Producer's Council-sponsored survey of consumers indicated general policymaker satisfaction with intelligence production. There are improvements and reforms necessary for better intelligence production. However, corrective action has been initiated in some of the subjects mentioned in the proposal such as making the National Intelligence Topics (NITs) more relevant; or there are already existing organizations functioning which could address other problems. Duplication of intelligence production is one prominent concern. The Intelligence Producers' Council in executive session is already constituted to deconflict duplication of national intelligence production.

3. There is an important difference between the Department of Defense and the Service departments on the one hand and some of the other intelligence-related agencies such as State Department, Justice, or Commerce. While the latter agencies have just one customer, U.S. Army intelligence production must satisfy unified/specified commanders and Army major commanders outside of Washington. In 1981 EO 12333 established that, "the Secretary of Defense shall...Conduct programs and missions necessary to fulfill national, departmental and tactical foreign intelligence requirements." EO 12333 established the leading nature of the DCI for national foreign intelligence production policy, and it tasked the Department of Defense and the Services to coordinate with the DCI on the production of foreign intelligence in areas other than national level intelligence.

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
SUBJECT: Army Staff's Response to the Proposal to Improve the DCI's Process for Requirements, Priorities, and Evaluation.

4. Because of this difference specific to the military intelligence producers, the U.S. Army as part of the Department of Defense has a concern specifically with proposal number four. The current IPC structure provides the needed focus for handling critical national level production requirements without contributing to unnecessary conflict with DOD and service production needs. Under the DDR&E proposal if a situation should develop that taskings from the DCI and taskings from other customers such as unified/specified commands or Army major commands competed for the Army's resources, military intelligence would need some mechanism for resolving that kind of conflict.

5. There are possibly some beneficial concepts brought out in the DDR&E proposal which merit further examination. For instance, the National SIGINT-Imagery-MASINT-HUMINT committees could consider establishing more uniform procedures for implementing the priorities for national intelligence collection. This idea, for example, and others should be examined in detail.

6. Some of these proposals may cause serious, unforeseen dislocations. Better ideas may gain currency if a wider circle of minds can be brought to bear. Therefore, I recommend that the DDR&E proposal receive more examination to include transformation into specific draft recommendations and that distribution of the draft recommendations be made to the affected agencies with sufficient time for staffing before a decision is requested from the DCI.

7. The ODCSINT point of contact is LTC Waldron, 694-4909.


SIDNEY T. WEINSTEIN
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Intelligence

CF:

DIA, DCI-3
NAVY, OP 922P (Rm 5B685)
AF, AFIA/INO (Rm 4A870)
USMC, (Mr Guenther)
Chairman, IPC

LTC Waldron/49709

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